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  This chapter  brings together the fields of  economics and  linguistics   on the topic of  
language origins. It concerns  properties of human language, particularly  how  linguistic 
signs or symbols have inherited design features present in linguistic communication .  I  
will show how some  features of language can be adequately understood as a result of  
coordination games. I will argue that modern language  originated as a consequence of  
trade relationships and the division of labor    involved by early humans  around 40.000  
years ago. As an economic activity, both trade ( or exchange) relationships and division 
of labor  call  for coordination. The  outcome is  that games and economic behavior 
have a significant causal relationship to some general properties of the linguistic symbol.  
   
              4.1  Adam Smith=s dog 
 
 Language and economics  have been related since at least Adam Smith=s reflections 
on the origin of the division of labor. Smith attributes the division of labor to language or 
the faculty of reason. In his Wealth of Nations of 1776.  Smith writes : 
    The division of labour , from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally   
   the effect of any human wisdom,..., it is the necessary   consequence of a certain       
propensity in human nature : the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing  
   for another ... This propensity ... seems to be the necessary consequence of the       
faculties of reason and speech. (Smith, 1776, p. 25 ) 
  Smith goes on to assert that this propensity is unique to man, thus  writing these  
famous words: 
    No body ever  saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for            
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 another with another dog. ( Smith, 1776, p.26 ) 
  
According to Smith=s , the division of labor, the exchange of goods and  language could 
all be causally related . The division of labor  produces a diversity of goods that could be 
exchanged. The exchange of goods  creates  the necessity of a contract, and contracts  
require  concerted or coordinated actions among  the contracting individuals. In 
coordinated actions , agents are  involved in communication games whereby  they  
convey the information required for the exchange. A symbolic and complex language 
then subserves the  communication of  information. 
  Modern linguistics as has also adopted a view  that  appeals  to economics and even 
political theory and political philosophy. Let me mention Ferdinand de Saussure who  in 
his Cours de Linguistique Générale of 1916  asserted  that the linguistic signs, or Ala 
langue A , had originated in a social contract: A There is a language  C Sassure says  1 -- 
 only in virtue of a kind of  social contract handed on among members of a community  A 
 Morover, the Swiss  linguist was the first to establish that  language was comprised of 
interrelated signs that form  a system. The saussurean sign is a one-to-one mapping 
from meaning  to sound that is lodged in the brains of at least  two speakers. All 
individuals  bound  by language,  Saussure   avows ,reproduce the same  sounds 2  
mapped onto the same concepts. The origin of this social crystalization, he goes on to 
explain , lies in the fact that the meaning-sound mapping is  the same for all the 
individuals sharing a language, because there is a coordination faculty that makes such 
coordination possible.       
   Some years later, in 1933,  the american linguist Leonard Bloomfield in his Language, 
a work  resting on Saussure,   emphasized more than Saussure  that language is a 
coordination problem between sound and meaning, and that this coordination  A makes 
 
1  F. de Saussure, Cours, Introd. III, ' 2 : A [ La langue ] n=existe qu=en vertu d=un 
sorte de contrat passé entre les membres de la communauté A .  
2Strictly speaking, it is a mental representation of the articulated sounds  what is 
mapped into a concept  or meaning. Both sound and meaning have a mental  reality. 
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it possible for man to interact with great precision  A.  He bolstered  Smith=s speculation 
on the relatedness of language to the division of labor, when he asserted that language 
always accompanies every human action.  
Bloomfield   argues that: 
A In the ideal case, within a group of people who speak to each other, each person has 
as its disposal the strength and skill of every person in the group.. The more these 
persons differ as to special skills, the wider a range of power does each one person 
control. The division of labor, and with it, the whole working of human society, is due to 
language A.( Bloomfield, 1933, p. 24 ) 
 
    Bloomfield=s approach to the function  of language calls to mind Smith=s speculation 
on language and division of labor. As economist Karl Wärneryd  remarked,   there is no 
logical reason to expect that language is what makes possible the exchange 3 . For one 
thing  division of labor -- although not as in humans --  occurs in animals without a 
complex language as in ants , wasps,  bees and wolf packs 4.  Specialization in social 
insects is so surprinsing that Dawkins (1989,p.180) asserts that these insects 
discovered - before man ! - that cultivation of food is more efficient than hunting-
gathering5 .   Therefore it is difficult to attribute   the faculty of language   the main 
 
3  Wärneryd (1995)  tackles the relationship between exchange and language in a 
different but insightful way  .  
4  Smith=s omission of social  features of insects was   noticed by Hendrik Houthakker 
, A Economics and Biology : Specialization and Speciation A, Kyklos, 9-2 ,pp.181-1897, 
(1956). Rececently, zoologist L. David Mech has added more evidence on the division of 
labor in wolf packs : A The typical wolf pack, then, should be viewed as a family with adult 
parents guiding the activities of the group and sharing group leadership in a division-of-labor 
system in which the female predominates primarily in such activities as pup care and defense 
and the male primarily during foraging and food provisioning and travels associated with 
them A. L. David Mech  A Alpha status, dominance and division of labor in wolf packs A, 
Canadian Journal of Zoology , 77:1196-1203, (1999, p.1202 ). 
5 Slavery, warfare, and  robbery can be found among social insects as well as in 
humans.See W.D. Hamilton ( 1995, p.216. 
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motivation that led to the division of labor 6. 
 As the division of labor may occur without language, it would behove us to look back  to 
trade, or to the deliberate exchange of goods as a reasonable hypothesis to explain how 
language originated and acquired its properties.
 
6 Also L.von Mises  asserted  that the division of labor makes man distinct from 
animals: A It is the division of labor that has made feeble man, far inferior to most animals in 
physical strength, the lord of earth and the creator of the marvels of technology A.L.von 
Mises,2005, p.18). Notwithstanding the core role of the division of labour, neoclassical and 
modern economists have observed that Smith=s theory would lead to an organization of the 
market dominated by  increasing returns, which is not borne out; see  Buchanan (1999) 
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In a recent paper, Horan et al. ( 2005)  developed a mathematical model ( “Shogran’s 
model “) to explain why Neanderthal man went extinct  while coexisting  with Homo 
sapiens. The title of their paper is fairly suggestive to my own present  purpose: A How 
Trade7 Saved Humanity from Biological Exclusion...@. They explore two hypotheses : 
biological exclusion and behavioral exclusion. 
    Biological exclusion predicts that the  neandertal extinction would have been slower 
than it actually was. Also, if neandertals were biologically more efficient, Shogren=s 
model predicts, contrary to fact, that  humans would not have coexisted with 
Neandertals. 
 The reason why humans survived, although they were biologically inferior to 
Neanderthals, is  better explained by  the behavioral exclusion theory. Behavioral 
exclusion theory proposes that  humans survived due to the  division of labor and 
specialization, which Neanderthals lacked. The most plausible scenario envisaged by 
Shogren=s model is one in which there is  complete division of labor within  two groups 
of humans: skilled hunters that harvested  meat and unskilled hunters who produced 
other goods. Incidentally, notice that these two groups of humans were already 
envisioned by Smith in the  Wealth of Nations I.ii.3 8   
 Even with a modicum of trade in NeandertHals, humans overcame them. Their  model 
 
7 Trade means in Shogren=s model  A exchange A , be it voluntary or involuntary 
(centralized o dictatorial ) . 
8 A In a tribe of hunters or sepherds a particular person makes bows and arrows, for 
example, with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them for 
cattle or for venison with his companions; and he finds at last that he can in this manner get 
more cattle and venison, than if he himself went to the field to catch them A ( A. Smith, 
1776,I.ii.3 ) 
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proves that humans survived  neandertals because of the availability of meat 
consumption was  greater  due to the division of labor. Horan et al. (2005,p.21) 
conclude their paper noticing thatAA crucial issue remains unresolved: it is an open 
question why the early humans first realized the competitive edge from trade. Some 
attribute the edge to differences in cognition or language abilities or both, but the jury is 
still out . A 
The issue may be elucidated by looking into Neandertal language. As  there is no  
evidence that Neanderthals had a complex language as there is of early humans 9, the 
hypothesis  that the competitive edge could be realized by developing abstract symbols 
becomes compelling.  The conclusion then that  language and trade coexisted  seems 
inescapable . It seems reasonable that all cognitive capacities involved in trade ( such 
as the designing of  tools for manufacturing exchangable goods, the exchange value of  
goods , and the ability to make decisions on goods ) should be observable in language. 
 The next step involves determining  which came  first, language or trade ?  
Although no definite answer can be given,  some logical priority goes to  trade . Three 
arguments may be adduced.  First, language is   a  necessary condition  neither for the 
division of labor nor for trade .In the Shogren - Smith  model, it is meat consumption and 
a previous division among members of the tribe ( skilled versus unskilled individuals)  
that  triggered the division of labor.  According to Shogren, the assumption that early 
humans were more skilled hunters than neandertals, allowed  them  to  produce meat 
enough to exchange for goods produced by unskilled hunters.  
 Second, as language basically  involves  coordination  problems, just as   trade and the 
division of labor do, it is plausible to assume that language depends on trade and the 
division of labor as well as on   the more complex social relations  added by trade. The 
 
9 There has been a hot debate on the issue of neandertal language.The issue has been 
settled by  P. Lieberman, The Biology and Evolution of Language, Cambr., Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1984 and S. Mithen, The Singing Neanderthals: The Origins of Music, 
Language, Mind and Body, Camb., Mass.:Harvard University Press, 2006, p.221, who argue 
that neandertals at most  had an inferior linguistic capacity than Homo sapiens. It should be 
emphasized that no real evidence for a neandertal language has been offered. 
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ground for this dependency lies in the fact that the division of labor leads to coordination 
between ( at least ) two individuals thus  incurring external coordination
Costs (Houthakker, 1956) . Then  language could have  evolved  in order to set  off such 
 costs.  
 The third argument is that some  games can be played ( or preplayed) using 
communication, and in particular cheap talk , which does not add more or less value to 
payoffs. 
  So trade may occur without language, but language must be motivated., in the sense 
that a speaker S sends a message μ  to a receiver R  with a particular intention.  
 The scenario set up by trading can  boost a  symbolic communication system as rich as 
modern human language. Karl Wärneryd ( 1995 )  addresses the role of language in  
economic activities reminding that neoclassical economists start from the premise that 
exchange  follows from the well-defined preferences of individuals with a basket of  
consumption goods . When preferences ( or payoffs) are in equilibrium, however, it  may 
occur that some equilibria are more efficient and stable than others. Communication 
selects the more efficient equilibrium if it  is costless. Exchange , then, triggers or 
motivates language, not the other way around. Consequently, if animals do not have full 
symbolic communication it=s  because they do not exchange goods , which  motivates 
the existence of a language 10. Smith=s dog has not evolved language because that  
would require exchange and coordination . As he has nothing to coordinate, he  needs 
no  language . The dog is tied to its costly signals.  
   I will conclude, then, that trade is a robust candidate  for the origins of a  modern 
symbolic language. 
 
 
 
10 W.D. Hamilton ( 1995, p.342)   makes   a case for the idea that tools and language 
confer benefits to a cooperative hunter . 
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   4. 2  Games and Symbols 
   
 Next, I will take up a subset of Hockett=s design features and  show how they fit into the 
coordination game  framework . We should bear in mind the main difference between 
traditional game theory and coordination game theory : the former  deals with winning 
strategies,  solutions  concepts and  equilibria , and  the latter deals with players=  
common  interests strategies  and possibly multiple equilibria.Consequently, players in 
common interest games  use of cognitive strategies  such as imitation, analogy,  
reasoning , guessing, imagination, common knowledge .  
 Design features are understood as properties that  characterize language as a  
communication system to compare language to signals of other nonhuman 
communication systems. For the moment, I will ignore animal signals and  focus on 
linguistics symbols as originated in the coordination game of trade and  the division of 
labor.I deal with the following  design features proposed by Hockett 11  :  Duality ,  
Semanticity,  Parity,  Specialization,  Prevarication,   Cultural transmission., and  
 Displacement of Reference.  
  Let=s look at  each of  these features to see   how  they might be construed as games.  
 
 
11 Some of these features were previously studied by Saussure , Bloomfield and 
Martinet , but are known as Hockett=s design features; C.F. Hockett,  A Logical Considera-   
tions in the Study of Animal Communication@, in: W. F. Lanyon and  W.N. Tavolga,eds, 
Animal Sounds and Communication, Washington, Am. Inst. of  Bio. Stud., Sympos. Ser. 7, 
(1960 ), 392-430.  
  4.2.1  Duality  
 Def.( Saussure, Course de Ling. Gen. I.1. '1 ) A The linguistic sign [i. e. symbol] is a 
mental entity with two faces : a concept [ meaning ]  and an acoustic image [ sound ] . 
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These two elements are tightly joined and one demands the other[ bidirectional mapping 
] @ .Idem I.1. '2 :  A The tie [ the mapping ] joining meaning and sound is arbitrary A . 
   The first conundrum  that  the saussurean sign  poses is  a coordination problem. In 
order to communicate, the agents  or the  speakers of a community must make the 
same associations between sound and meaning. Such coordination  is  solved by 
means of  a  coordination game 12  between meaning and sound . It must be noticed 
that Saussure ( Cours, Intro. III. ' 2 ) put forth that speakers in a population P must be 
endowed with  A  receptive and  coordinating faculties A  to attain the same  one-to-one 
mapping. Therefore meaning and sound must be coordinated in a communicating  
population P of senders / receivers because both meaning and sound are unattached to 
each other. Meaning of  sign S1 could ,a priori, be attached to any other string of sounds 
σn  and vice versa. This coordination problem   can thus  be formulated in the following  
way : how do  sender and  receiver of a  message assign the same bidirectional 
mapping from meaning into sound and from sound into meaning ? 
  As all members of the population P  want to use the same signs to communicate ,they 
all  share a common interest and therefore must coordinate  their choice. This is in 
essence  a coordination game, in the sense of  Schelling  . More specifically, he 
characterizes a coordination game as follows:  
   (1 ) Players= preferences are identical, so  there is no conflict of interest 
 ( 2 ) Each player=s best choice depends on the action he expects the other to take, 
which in turn depends on the other=s expectations of his own. In other words, the game 
is based upon the  players=  mutual expectations.  
 
12 Wittgenstein=s language games may be construed as coordination games. See L. 
Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen , '' 2, 8, 21, 48-51.   
 ( 3 ) The players=  goal is to share some common- interest activity by means of a 
cognitive process ( such as  imagination, poetry and humor ). In the case of language, 
players want to use the same signs to communicate with each other.  
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Let’s look at table 1. One player  chooses a Row and other player chooses a  Column. 
Row and Column represent tacit processes determining the payoffs. Since unlike  in 
zero sum game  the players’  goal is not   but   to share some common interest by  
tacitly  searching through cognitive processes, payoffs  only represent the degree of 
coordination attained by the players13 . So the payoff  matrix for a coordination game is 
different from zero sum games and nonzero sum games. If players combine < R1 , C1 > 
they are better off than combining < R1, C2 > and better off than combining < R2 , C1 > 
and so on. As it is possible that whenever choosing one Row and chosing one Column 
players A win A , that is, they guess what each other is thinking, this winning  results < 1, 
1 >  can be arranged in a diagonal line .                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Such processes may  equal to the usual strategies in conflict games, but 
contrary to conflict games,  no minimax solution exists for them.      
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                              Table  1 
 ( Lower left entry in cells is payoff to row-player, upper right is payoff to  column-player) 
  Let=s get  back now  to design features of language. Duality is conceived in Saussure=s 
sense as a  bidirectional  mapping from sound and meaning such that both sound and 
meaning   are autonomous of each other but  must be coordinated by the senders and 
the receivers in order for them  to attain optimal communication .  What cognitive 
strategies are involved in duality ?  Some tacit strategies that  come to mind  are  
Random mapping,  Imitation , Probabilistic mapping , and   knowledge of   convention in 
the sense of David Lewis  (1969 )  . 
   Linguistic conventions are not explicit but tacit  agreements. This means that speakers 
must use cognitive strategies to coordinate sound and meaning. Convention can be 
arrived  at by calling on a variety of such strategies. Saussure assumed the existence of 
a coordinative capacity in man. This assumption , however, sets up a circular argument. 
 
 13 
A much more adequate explanation  is  provided by   Lewis= convention.  
  
4. 2 . 2 Semanticity  
     Def.  A The elements of a communicative system [ linguistic symbols] have 
associative ties with things and situations, or types of things and situations, in the 
environment of its users... such ties   are  semantic conventions shared by speakers A  
( Hockett, 1960, 41) 
  The bidirectional mapping sound-meaning should be distinguished from the mapping 
symbol - denotation (  things, situations,  or simply , actions  ). Adopting a Lewisian 
theory of meaning, symbols ( or signals in the sense of game theory  ) are mapped into 
actions  so  that actions can be true or false if they establish a coordinating equilibrium. 
Table 4. 2 shows such equilibrium. Signal A means ( is mapped onto) action X , with 
payoff (1,1 ) , while signal B means action Y with payoff (1, 1 ) .Mapping is established 
by convention . 
              
                                       Receiver 
                                         Action 
                                    X        Y        
 Sender signal    A      1,1    0,0      
    type                B       0,0   1,1  
 
                            Table 4. 2                         
 
4.2. 3  Interchangeability  ( parity )  
       Def. A Adult members of any speech community are interchangeably transmitters 
and receivers of linguistic signals A ( Hockett, 1960, 155 )  
   This feature derives from the definition of a coordination game without proof, as this 
game is played by pairs of speakers. Yet parity has been challenged by rationalist 
philosophers and linguists.  Rationalist   claim  that language is used  only for the 
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expression and representation  of thought , not for social communication. However, the 
game- theoretic  approach to language requires  that   language be strictly    used and 
motivated for the communication of intentions. Besides, this should be taken not only as 
its current function, but as the original function 14.Since the communicative function 
overrides the representational function in efficiency of coordination, the claim that 
language is for the expression of thought is not  motivated by game theory,  
Communication,  not expression of thinking,  subserves coordination.      
 
 
14 Assuming that communication is both the original and the current function of 
language avoids the issue ( for which Darwinism lacks an adequate response) of how an 
original organ transforms its original function into another function, contrary to N. Chomsky 
that asserts that we don=t know the original purpose of language, although he assumes a 
transformation of the original function into the A expression of thought A function; Kirschner 
and  Gerhart ( 2005 ) and Hauser et al. (2002). 
4.2.4 Specialization  
     Def.: A A communicative act, or a whole communicative system, is specialized to the 
extent that its direct energetic consequences are biologically irrelevant . Obviously 
language is a specialized communicative system. A ( Hockett, 1960, p.  139 ) 
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   Contrary to human language, animal signals have direct biological consequences as 
well as energetic costs . In insects, signals ( calls and songs ) emitted by a male insect 
serve to attract  females  as sexual mates 15 .  The bees=  dance informs  only  about the 
food source 16.  Also birds= alarm signals alert other conspecifics to flee. The bird  that 
warns its conspecifics by emiting an alarm call  is in grave danger of  dying because it 
attracts the predator=s attention. This  shows that communicative behaviour in animals 
adopts  strategies that incur  costs and  benefits , just as in the conflict of interest game. 
  Dawkins points out  that  A the belief that animal communication signals originally 
evolve to foster mutual benefits, is too simple A . Rather, he continues, A  all animal 
interactions involve at least  some conflict of interest A ( Dawkins, 1989,pp.68-87). Since 
 linguistic communication is basically  a  coordination game, it  is  costless or cheap;  
costs and benefits of sending and receiving signals are irrelevant .  Language, then, 
may  be conceived as a signalling game, where both sender and receiver obtain equal  
payoffs because they share the same interests17 . Moreover, animals signals may be 
dishonest, while language lacks dishonest signals.  Language evolved for coordination,  
which sets  a  barrier for a strict Darwinian view of language origins 18. 
  
4. 2. 5   Prevarication 
        Def.  A Linguistic messages can be false, and they can be meaningless in the 
logicien=s sense.  A (Hockett, 1963, p.  14 ) 
 
15 H. Carl Gerhardt and Franz Huber, Acoustic Communication in Insects and 
Anurans, The University of Chicago Press, 2002, observed that some insects lose weight 
during call transmission. 
16  For these and other examples of animal calls , see R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, 1989. 
17 Otherwise said, the utility function of Sender u ( s )  and Receiver u ( a  ) are equal.  
18 Because linguistic communication is a pure coordination, mass phenomenon (  
individuals being genetically unrelated),  it  presents a real conundrum for  natural selection 
account of language origins and evolution,  concerning individuals and genes . For instance 
Pinker (1995) does not take up these issues.  
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One of the main differences  between animal signals and linguistic symbols is in  
animal=s  signals  communication  being truthful , while communication by linguistic 
symbols possibly not . Signals  correspond to a set of fixed states either of the animal 
type   ( hunger, sex ) or the environmental type ( danger ). Therefore, prevarication or 
lying is not  a real option for animals 19 . However, the possibility of  the receiver being 
manipulated by the sender has been emphasized as an option in animal communication 
( Dawkins,1989, p.64 ) . On the other hand, linguistic communication assumes truthful  
messages  sent by truthful senders.   This is called the Atruth bias A by game theorists 
.The speaker , in turn , is commited to the truth of his messages.  
 The nature of lying is due to the symbolic character of human communication  
comprising  conventionality and unboundedness  .  Biologically, lying is a cost for a 
symbolic system because it contributes to the selfish and parasitical, but  non-
coordinating behavior( Hamilton, 1995,p.132 ) .  
 Game theory    recognises both   the existence of lying and “The Decay of Lying “, as 
Oscar Wilde  put it in this comedy 20  . Lying is a kind of behavior that fits into  a  two 
person partial- interest game, that is, a game in which some agent is coordinating non-
 
19 W. D. Hamilton( 1995, p.218 )who writes  on  A Selection of selfish and altruistic 
behavior in some extreme models A, remarks that  A by our lofty standards, animals are poor 
liers@ ; In turn, Karl Popper ( 1974, p. 1112-3 )   suggested that Ahuman language evolved 
because it made lying possible A. 
 
20  Wilde=s words wittily express the nonpredominance of lying : A With the possible 
exceptions of barristers, lying as an art has decayed. A.On lying as a game see Wittgenstein( 
1953, § 249). 
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strictly . Table 4. 3  represents   such a game in which the sender sends a signal which 
triggers a best action by receiver  
 
 
 
                   Receiver 
                                         Action 
                                    X        Y        Z 
 Sender signal    A      4,4    1,1       6, 3 
    type                B      1,1    4, 4      6, 3 
                                           Table 3 
                              Partial interest game ( lying ) 
 
  This matrix  enlists values of common interests as well as of conflict of interests. The 
  combinations < A, Z > = ( 6, 3 ) and combination < B, Z > represent the case  in which 
 the sender has obtained a profit over the receiver21 . 
  Note, however, that lying is  violates linguistic conventions, but these conventions can=t 
be associated with lying because  there would  then  be a winning strategy for the 
receivers  such as  A If the sender lies  Busing a lying strategy B do not act as  sender 
expects A . Thus a better and winnng strategy  would eventually evolve. Therefore, one 
can deduce that lying cannot be evolutionary stable ( Dawkins, 1989,p.77 ).This  
evolutionary game  explains  why there are no markers ( conventions)  for lying in 
human languages.  
 
4.2. 6  Cultural transmission 
        Def. A The continuity of language from generation to generation is provided by 
 
21 Experimental work by Kawagoe & Takizawa ( 2005) shows that lying pays as well 
as the truth bias of agents. 
 
 18 
                                                
tradition. All traditional behaviour is learned [ from others ]. Tradition becomes 
transformed into cultural transmission when the passing down of traditional habits is 
mediated by symbols. A  ( Hockett, 1960, p. 155 ) 
  Symbols  are learned  from  generations to generations, and they grammatical patterns 
. Linguists and psychologists  argue  whether  an innate , not culturally but genetically 
transmitted device exists  that makes learning of  grammar  possible. Supporters of an 
innate device assume the existence of an absolute invariant22  Universal Grammar (UG) 
genetically transmitted  that would explain language learning with no resort to cultural 
transmission.UG is conceived  as a random generator device or an automaton.  
   The UG hypothesis , however, has not found observable or empirical universals that 
account for overt and regular  crosslinguistic variation 23.  
A different way to tackle  regular variations, (sometimes termed  Greenberg universals), 
is  to look at it as a coordination game problem in Schelling=s sense.  Language  learning 
requires the  input from the community . All learners must converge on the input 
grammar, that is, they must coordinate their grammars with those of the input. When 
coordination problems persist  among members of a community, that community yields 
regular patterns to  solving such problems or otherwise  adopt them from other 
communities (for example, by cultural diffusion ). These regular patterns turn into 
 
22  Note, however,that is false in a strict (neo)darwinian view. 
23 Universals of the kind required by supporters of the random generator view of 
universal grammar are located at the biological ( brain )  level of inquiry, skipping most of 
overt linguistic properties and offering no general account of crosslinguistic variation. At 
present such universals are missing, apart from the automaton. 
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common knowledge within the community 24 . Note also that in a coordination game an 
agent selects an action in an undetermined way within a bounded set. Thus using a  
bounded number of actions weexpect different conventions  for different  communities. 
 
24 Lewis ( 1969 ) adopted such a view which can be extended to the realms of 
language learning and  language evolution.  
In fact, some computational models of language evolution  suggest  that overt empirical  
universals arise out of multiagents that evolve across generations ( Kirby & Hurfor 
2001). Here linguistic generalizations (  grammatical rules  ) emerge from cultural 
transmission, making the assumption of  innate Universal Grammar unnecessary.      
 
 4.2. 7  Displacement of reference. 
      Def. :  AIf we had perfect definitions [ of words ] , we should still discover that during 
many utterances the speaker was not at all in the situation which we had defined. 
People very often utter a word like apple when no apple at all is present . We may call 
this displaced speech . The frequency and importance of displaced speech is obvious. 
Relayed speech embodies a very important use of language: speaker A sees some 
apples and mentions them to speaker B, who has not seen them; speaker B relays this 
news to C, C to D, D to E and so on, and it may be that none of these persons has seen 
them, when finally speaker goes and eats some.  In other ways,too, we utter linguistic 
forms when the typical stimulus is absent . A  ( Bloomfield, 1933, p. 141 )    
     
   The displacement of reference has been taken to be a key property of language.  
Chomsky ( 1966 )  highlights displacement under the A absence from stimulus A 
argument, which he uses against  the behavioural account of language use.  
Displacement ( or absence of stimulus ) can be derived from  (i) semanticity and ( ii ) 
specialization. As we have seen, semanticity is the result of conventions under a 
coordinating equilibrium, while specialization  yields costless communication ( cheap talk 
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) .  Semanticity provides for conventional and arbitrary symbols that can be stored  in 
memory, while specialization makes cheap the use of symbols so that agent A can relay 
information (at no cost ) to agent B, agent  B  to agent C  and so on, so that the whole 
population of agents can exchange information not perceived at the moment of the 
utterance.  
  The fact that symbols can be relayed  accounts for one crucial property of language: 
sentence recursion. If agent A relays to B  A John ran away A, B can relay this 
information to agent C  as embedded into another symbol :  B says : A John ran away@,  
and C relays to D :  B  says A  A says A John ran away A @, and   so on. Recursion , then, 
is a property that emerges  from displaced reference , and is not imposed by  Universal 
Grammar. The case in which knowledge of an event is acquired from hearsay ( i. e.  
displaced from the speaker )   sets up the evidential modality. Some languages 
morphologically mark events known from evidence acquired in this way. Thus Tunica, 
Bulgarian, and  Kwakiutl - among a wide set of languages- use evidentiality markers to 
signal that the speaker knows the information from others.  Other linguistic processes 
are  direct consequences of displaced reference such as indirect questions, quoted 
speech, discourse representation discourse or free indirect discourse. Moreover, 
displacement adds a significant edge to a population of agents  using referential 
symbols : it spares  time invested  in searching for information that otherwise an agent 
needs to obtain in the presence of stimulus. The spared time  can be invested in other 
activities increasing  the number of activities that the population can engage in. 
Displacement increases the production possibility curve 25 .   
 
4.3. Conclusions.  
 
25 I deal with  time allocation related to displacement in : A. Alonso-Cortés y F. 
Cabri- llo, The Economics of Language: A Coordination Game Approach, ms.UCM, Madrid, 
2006. 
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    Language and trade are related to each  other because both involve the kinds of  
exchange problems that may be solved  by  coordination games. Modern symbolic 
language might have been boosted   as a tool to set off external coordination costs 
incurred by trade (goods  exchange )  in modern human populations.From coordination 
games and a cost - benefit analysis  one can  derive a subset of design features of 
language . Some significant and crucial features of language such as duality, 
semanticity, displacement of reference and prevarication are a direct consequence of 
coordination among memebers of a population, while coordination through  evolutionary 
games account for cultural transmission.  
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